Able Danger

U.S. Special Operations Command assembled planners, operators, and analysts to develop a campaign against al-Qaeda. One part of the work used a technique called link analysis. Analysts turned large collections of records into charts that showed possible connections among people and organizations. The military accepted the team’s campaign plan in January 2001.

The charts and the deleted files

Erik Kleinsmith, who led an Army intelligence analysis branch that supported the project, told a Senate hearing that his team had begun with a broad question: where did al-Qaeda operate, and how was it organized? They gathered material from the internet and drew preliminary charts. Kleinsmith recalled that they had identified a U.S. presence but had yet to pin down specific people or operations inside the country when their work stopped.

Kleinsmith told senators he deleted the data and destroyed the charts in the spring of 2000. He told Pentagon investigators he had erased about 2.5 terabytes. He said he was following a rule that allowed intelligence units to hold information about U.S. persons temporarily, for up to 90 days, while they determined whether they could keep it. The inspector general confirmed that the Army unit destroyed data and preliminary work. Investigators found no evidence that the project had identified a future hijacker.

What Phillpott and Shaffer remembered

In July 2004, Navy Captain Scott Phillpott asked to speak with the 9/11 Commission. He told senior counsel Dieter Snell that he briefly saw Mohamed Atta’s name and photograph on a chart in another officer’s notebook. He dated the chart to early 2000 and could neither produce it nor explain how the analyst had identified Atta. The commission’s chair and vice chair later said staff had looked for corroboration in the project’s records and in evidence of Atta’s travels. They left the account out of the final report.

Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer raised a separate question about what the team could have shared. He said he tried to arrange briefings with the FBI and that military officials stopped them on legal advice. He also alleged that the Defense Intelligence Agency retaliated against him for speaking about Able Danger. The Pentagon inspector general did not substantiate the retaliation allegation, though it identified procedural problems in the agency’s handling of his office belongings and performance reports.

Curt Weldon takes the case to Congress

Pennsylvania Representative Curt Weldon made Able Danger a public issue in 2005. On the House floor in June, he asked why the 9/11 Commission’s report left out the program. As the lead witness at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that September, he said he had personally delivered a chart of al-Qaeda connections to Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley two weeks after the attacks. Weldon said he kept no copy. In his 2005 book Countdown to Terror, he claimed the chart showed Atta. The 9/11 Commission’s former leaders said they had found no documentation that Able Danger had identified Atta before the attacks.

Weldon kept pressing after the hearing. In October he wrote to the defense secretary and the Pentagon inspector general seeking an explanation for the suspension of Shaffer’s security clearance. The inspector general cited Weldon’s requests among those that shaped its investigation.

What investigators found

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s staff interviewed all five people who recalled seeing Atta’s name and photograph on a chart. After reviewing their accounts and the available records, the staff concluded that Able Danger had not identified Atta or any of the other hijackers before the attacks. The staff also found no evidence that officials prevented the team from contacting the FBI or that the project produced information that warranted passing to the bureau.